

THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES MILITARY IN  
COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS IN THE YEAR 2000

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army  
Command and General Staff College in partial  
fulfillment of the requirements for the  
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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M.S., National University, San Diego, California, 1995

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas  
1997

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
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
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
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
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement).

## ABSTRACT

### THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES MILITARY IN COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS IN THE YEAR 2000 by Major Adele E. Hodges, 63 pages.

This study looks into the feasibility of change in the United States military's role in counterdrug operations in the year 2000. The dangers of illegal drug usage and trafficking have had a major effect on the United States. In 1983 President Reagan declared a "war on drugs" because of the threat narcotics trafficking posed to the national security of the United States. In doing this, he enrolled the use of many Federal agencies to include the military. The drug threat remains a threat to the United States as many countries abroad continue to depend on the income from illegal drug products for their livelihood. However, with the possibility of decreased personnel and financial resources, the future status of the military is hard to envision. The possibility of an increased role or continued current counterdrug role may affect combat readiness of the military. In conclusion, the military plays an important role in the United States counterdrug effort. Although its effects are difficult to measure, its participation continues to be necessary to protect the security of the United States. In that respect it is imperative that the military maintain its current counterdrug role as it approaches the new millennium in accordance with the law and future resources.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration
DLEA	Drug Law Enforcement Agency
DOD	Department of Defense
DOJ	Department of Justice
D&M	Detection and Monitoring
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
JTF	Joint Task Force
JITF	Joint Interagency Task Force
LEA	Law Enforcement Agency
MAGTF	Marine Corps Air Ground Task Force
NDPB	National Drug Policy Board
NSDD	National Security Decision Directive
ONDCP	Office of National Drug Control Policy
USA	United States Army
USAF	United States Air Force
USBP	United States Boarder Patrol
USCINCSOUTH	Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command
USCG	United States Coast Guard
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USN	United States Navy

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

The use, distribution, and trafficking of illegal drugs within the United States have taken a toll on American society. What used to be more or less a socially acceptable pleasure for the elite is now the cause of many deaths throughout the United States. It clearly constitutes a major cause of many of the societal problems we see today and, worst of all, a threat to the United States national security. In 1971 President Nixon, a central figure among the international leaders, took a stand against the use of these drugs. He made a point by intensifying programs directed at illegal drug use. However, at that time he was not looking for direct military involvement. Rather, he was depending on each American citizen to take the responsibility for assisting in stopping the abuse of illegal substances. During the 1960s and the early 1970s the country was in the midst of an era where young Americans, in particular, had turned to the high consumption of marijuana and other illegal drugs as well. This marked the beginning of a drug culture that incorporated larger and larger numbers of adherents. The President, on the other hand, called these drugs a national menace.

Cocaine became the drug of choice by the late 1970s and into the 1980s. Drug usage began to spread from the middle and upper classes of society to the very poor and the very young. The effects of drug abuse began to affect even younger members of society to include pre-teenagers and infants. Over the last five years the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) has reported that approximately 100,000 to 300,000 babies were exposed to illicit drugs prior to birth. Also, about 5.1 percent of mothers tested positive for illicit drug use just prior to delivery. Many

of these babies were born addicted to, or developmentally handicapped by, cocaine, heroin, and other drugs.

In 1983 President Reagan refocused the nation on the drug situation by initiating a national effort to attack the drug problem. He declared what is characterized as a “war on drugs.” However, this time he enrolled the use of the military and increased the participation of other Federal agencies. The military’s new counterdrug role was to support the other federal, state, and local counterdrug agencies that were mobilized and redesigned to fight this war, domestically and outside the United States. In 1981, prior to the President’s push for increased military support, Congress passed the Military Cooperation With Law Enforcement Agencies Act. This act gave the President a means to provide military assistance in support of domestic counterdrug operations without being in violation of the Posse Comitatus Act. Prior to this action the Posse Comitatus Act placed restrictions on Federal military support in domestic law enforcement affairs in any form.

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the current role, of the armed forces in counterdrug support for the purpose of determining the optimal role in which the military should perform in counterdrug operations in the year 2000. This is an important concern because the year 2000 is less than three years away. The issue under examination in this thesis is important because the future strength and resources of the United States military at the beginning of the new millennium are uncertain, even though it is almost upon us. This makes identifying the optimal military role more complex today than it was a decade ago when it began.

One of the areas that will be discussed is how the military’s involvement has affected this ever growing threat. The threat has changed by the increase in the amount of illegal drugs transported into the United States and the improvement in technology of the traffickers. The Department of Defense also makes improvements to counter this ever growing threat. The research for this thesis was conducted using a descriptive comparison method. It looked at the types

military forces that can conduct counterdrug operations and their capabilities and compared them to the threats involved.

Initially, however, this thesis will discuss how the military's role has developed over the years and how it interacts with the other government agencies involved in counterdrug activities. It will also discuss in detail what the specific military capabilities are that makes the armed forces unique in this situation. One of the Department of Defense's major contributions to the war on drugs has been its ability to produce a drug free, noncorrupt, military force. While the internal counterdrug measures taken to rid itself of drug abuse problems will not be discussed in this thesis military approaches in this regard meant further study.

This thesis will be presented in five chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the theme and purpose. It discusses the increase in illegal drug trafficking and drug use and its impact on the United States. This chapter will provide insight into the reason and justification for the need for military power to counter this increased threat as well as the purpose for this study.

The second chapter provides insight how the threat of illegal drugs has changed over the years. This chapter also discusses where these drugs come from and provides insight into how and why they are reaching a market within the United States. Also included in this chapter is information on how illegal drug usage is having an increasingly detrimental effect on American society and how it constitutes a national security threat to the United States.

The third chapter discusses the role that the military plays in counterdrug operations and how it has developed from its initial participation in counterdrug operations. Chapter 3 also identifies the military organizations that have permanent roles in counter drug operations and identifies the nonmilitary agencies to which the military provides supports.

The fourth chapter discusses the military's capabilities and how these can be applied to counterdrug operations. This chapter will identify the types of units that can provide the necessary structure for this type of operation.

The fifth chapter identifies what, in the author's view, the future role of the military in counterdrug support should be in the year 2000. This chapter specifically addresses the thesis question: What type of role will there be for the military in counterdrug operations in the year 2000? It will also address secondary questions that will be encountered while attempting to answer the thesis question: If there is going to be a military role, how will that affect the future capabilities of the military? What impact, if any, will a long term commitment or increased role have on the combat readiness of United States forces? How will additional downsizing and budget reductions affect current and future participation in counterdrug operations? In short, the fifth chapter identifies the potential future role of the military in further counterdrug operations.

#### Scope and Limitations

This thesis examines the effect that military involvement is having on stopping the flow of illegal drugs coming into the United States and being distributed throughout the country. It will also address what effects, if any, counterdrug operations are having on the military. As a Marine Corps officer, this thesis is important to the author in determining the role of the Marine Corps and the impact these operations will have on the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps' role is only a component of the entire military's role. Therefore, it is important to concentrate on the future role for the entire military, in order to determine the full scope of the Department of Defense's participation in counternarcotic operations. It is limited by the availability of documented material which can provide authoritative information to support the investigation of my thesis question. The research will be conducted using unclassified military and nonmilitary documents that provide

insight into the military participation in past, present, and future counterdrug operations. It will also include nonmilitary sources which will discuss drug operations and the use of Drug Law Enforcement Agencies (DLEA) as well as the military.

### Definition of Terms

Counterdrug and drug trafficking have a unique language and terms. The following list of terms and definitions will provide a better understanding of the terms used throughout this study.

Counterdrug and Counternarcotics. In this thesis, the terms counterdrug and counternarcotic will be interchangeable. These are measures taken to disrupt, interdict, and destroy illicit drug activities.<sup>1</sup>

Detection and Monitoring. The operation of detection equipment to intercept a vessel or aircraft as it approaches the United States. The purpose is to identify and communicate with that vessel or aircraft after it reaches the land, or sea areas of the United States and to direct it to go to a location designated by appropriate civilian officials if it is unauthorized. In those cases in which a vessel or an aircraft is detected outside of the land area of the United States DOD personnel may begin or continue pursuit of it over the land area of the United States.<sup>2</sup> Detection and monitoring can also include ground monitoring on the border.

Downsizing. Reconstructing the size of the organization by decreasing the number of personnel authorized to serve as members of the organization.

Drug Interdiction. To prohibit or cut off the advancement of drugs by force or fire power.

Hectare. A metric unit of area equal to 2.471 acres.

Host Nation. A nation which receives either forces or supplies or forces and supplies from allied nations and NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory.<sup>3</sup>

Joint Task Force. A force composed of assigned or attached elements of the Army, the Navy, the Marine Corps and the Air Force, or two or more of these services, so designated by the Secretary of Defense or by the commander of a unified command, a specified command, or an existing joint task force.<sup>4</sup>

Nonoperational Support. Support provided by the military to Drug Law Enforcement Agencies (DLEAs) and Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) in the form of lease, loan or transfer of equipment without personnel, use of training facilities and other services.

Operational Support. Support provided by the military to DLEAs and LEAs in the form of equipment and personnel and training provided by military personnel.

Posse Comitatus Act. Historically, “posse comitatus” refers to the authority of the sheriff or other peace officer to call to his aid the male population of the county or a body of men to assist in capturing escaped felons and keeping the peace. The Posse Comitatus Act was passed by Congress in 1878 to limit the use of the United States Army in domestic affairs to enforce public law. The Department of Defense has extended this prohibition to include the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. (In this thesis, when considered bound by Posse Comitatus, the Federal military will be used when referring to the Act itself.) That is, the act prohibits the Federal military from being directly involved in law enforcement duties, such as arrest, search seizure, and other duties of enforcing the law within United States borders, except in cases authorized by the Constitution or act of Congress.

Rules of Engagement. Directives issued by the competent military authority which delineated the circumstances and limitations under which United States Military forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered.<sup>5</sup>

Unified Command. A command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Military

Departments, and which is established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They are called unified combatant commands.<sup>6</sup>

At this point, the evolving role of the military in drug interdiction will be addressed.

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<sup>1</sup>U.S. Army, FM 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operational Forces (Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1991).

<sup>2</sup>Detection and Monitoring of Aerial and Maritime Transit of Illegal Drugs: Department of Defense Lead Agency Act, U.S. Code, Chapter 10, sec. 124 (1992).

<sup>3</sup>Department of Defense, Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington: Department of Defense, 1994), 189.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, 207.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, 361.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*, 438.



## CHAPTER 2

### THE CHANGING THREAT

The use of drugs for recreational purposes, including substances that have been specifically banned or controlled, is not a new activity. It can be traced to the beginning of United States history. The first anti-drug law, passed in San Francisco in 1877, outlawed opium smoking in opium “dens” which were established just for that purpose. Although this law was passed in some measure because of prejudice against the Chinese, it revealed an awareness that these drugs may be harmful. This led to the passing of the federal law one year later in 1888.<sup>1</sup> By 1990, over 50 percent of the crimes committed in the United States were linked to the use or trafficking of illegal drugs.<sup>2</sup> The media (television and newspaper), and especially “breaking news” services, like Cable News Network (CNN), bring the effects of drug abuse right into our living rooms. They show in detail the reality of adults, and many times children dying of drug overdoses, being shot in the streets, or involved in some other drug-related activity.

#### The Drugs

There are five major categories of controlled or illegal drugs that have been identified by the DEA as a concern. They are:

1. Narcotics--opium, morphine, codeine, heroin, hydromorphone, meperidine, methadone, and others.
2. Depressants--chloral hydrate, barbiturates, benzodiazepines, methaqualone, glutethimide, and others.

3. Stimulants—cocaine, amphetamine, phenmetrazine, and others.
4. Hallucinogens—LSD, mescaline, peyote, amphetamine variants, phencyclidine, phencyclidine analogues, and other.
5. Cannabis—marijuana, hashish, and hashish oil whose active ingredient is tetrahydrocannabinol.

The abuse of these drugs has led to addiction, death, drug-related crimes, and a host of family problems among American citizens. Illegal drugs are imported into the United States from all over the world with substantial quantities grown and manufactured within the borders of the United States. Most of them are derived from natural resources grown in the warmer parts of the world.

Cocaine, the drug of choice for many American drug abusers during the 1980s, is derived from the coca plant. Virtually all of the coca is grown and refined in Latin America. Most of the cocaine that enters the United States comes out of South America through Central America and Mexico or through the Caribbean to Florida and the United States East Coast. The primary producers of cocaine are Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia. It is estimated that essentially all of the world's coca production and cocaine products come out of that region. Peru and Bolivia cultivate the bulk of the coca plant used for cocaine products. Coca leaf and coca base are shipped to Columbia (also a coca growing region) for production into cocaine or cocaine products.<sup>3</sup>

The U.S. Department of States in 1996 estimated that over sixty percent of the world's coca plant is grown in Peru alone. The annual income for coca products to Peru is approximately \$1 billion which is thirty percent of the total value of the country's annual export total. Peruvian coca industry employs 15 percent of the country's total work force.

Table 1

## Estimated Worldwide Potential Illicit Drug Production

(Metric Tons)

Country	1995	1994	1993	1992	1991	1990
<b>Opium</b>						
Afghanistan	1,250	950	685	640	570	415
India	-	82	-	-	-	-
Pakistan	155	160	140	175	180	165
Burma	2,340	2,030	2,575	2,280	2,350	2,255
China	16	25	-	-	-	-
Laos	180	85	180	230	265	275
Thailand	25	17	42	24	35	40
Colombia	65	-	-	-	-	-
Lebanon	15	-	4	-	34	32
Guatemala	-	-	4	-	17	13
Mexico	53	60	57	40	92	107
<b>Total Opium Gum</b>	<b>4,086</b>	<b>3,409</b>	<b>3,745</b>	<b>3,389</b>	<b>3,492</b>	<b>3,257</b>
<b>Coca Leaf</b>						
Bolivia	85,000	89,800	84,400	80,300	78,000	77,000
Colombia	40,800	35,800	31,700	29,600	30,000	32,100
Peru	183,800	155,500	155,500	222,700	196,900	186,300
Ecuador	-	-	100	100	40	170
<b>Total Coca Leaf</b>	<b>309,400</b>	<b>290,900</b>	<b>217,700</b>	<b>265,500</b>	<b>330,740</b>	<b>306,170</b>
<b>Cannabis</b>						
Mexico	3,650	5,540	6,280	7,795	7,775	19,715
Colombia	4,133	4,138	4,125	1,650	1,650	2,800
Jamaica	206	208	502	263	641	825
Belize	-	-	-	-	49	60
Others	3,500	3,500	3,500	3,500	3,500	3,500
<b>Total Cannabis</b>	<b>7,839</b>	<b>13,386</b>	<b>14,407</b>	<b>13,208</b>	<b>13,615</b>	<b>25,600</b>

Source: Estimated Worldwide Potential Illicit Drug Net Production, 1996, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report March 1996 [on-line]. Available: [www.usis.usemb.se/drugs/EXEC/EXXPOT.HMT](http://www.usis.usemb.se/drugs/EXEC/EXXPOT.HMT).

In Bolivia there are approximately 250,000 to 300,000 peasants in the Chapare and Isiboro areas whose livelihood depends directly on the growing and processing of the cocaine products.<sup>4</sup> This is about one-fifth of the adult working population. The \$600 million revenue in coca export is approximately one half of the country's total annual export. Table 1 provides an estimated worldwide potential drug production from 1990 to 1995. These figures are the U.S. Department of State's estimate of potential production and are on the estimate that could be produced if all available crops were to be converted into finished goods.

Heroin, derived from the opium poppy, constitutes one of the greatest threat to the United States. The opium poppy is cultivated in three regions of the world: Southeast Asia, Southwest Asia, and Latin America.<sup>5</sup> The Southeast Asian area, known as the "Golden Triangle" (consisting of China, Vietnam, Burma, Thailand, and Cambodia) and Southwest Asian area, known as the "Golden Crescent" (consisting of Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan) produce the bulk of opium products. These areas are the operational concern of the Joint Interagency Task Force West (JIATF-West). Like cocaine, the addiction capability of heroin is very high and this assures that there will always be a high demand. High demands generate large quantities of cash that can be used for legal investment and for the establishment of front companies for money laundering

It was estimated that in Southeast Asia, the Golden Triangle, cultivation and production of opium poppy rose substantially in 1995. The indicators are that Burma, Laos, and Thailand cultivated an estimated 175,470 hectares of opium poppy yielding 2,454 metric tons of opium gum. This gum is used to produce other narcotics, such as morphine and heroin. Production estimates for Thailand indicated an estimated forty-seven percent rise of potential production in 1995 over the estimate for 1994.<sup>6</sup>

Southwest Asia, the Golden Crescent, had an estimated increase in the cultivation of opium poppy two years in a row during 1994 and 1995. The product increased from 36,540 hectares to 45,690 hectares. Afghanistan and Pakistani crop cultivation increased 25 percent during that period.

Cannabis (marijuana) as well as the other types of drugs can be domestically grown and manufactured. Marijuana can be grown indoors or outside, sometimes making it difficult for Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) to detect or locate these plants. The majority of the marijuana imported into the United States comes from Mexico and Columbia. However, other shipments have been known to come from the Caribbean, Asia, and the Middle East.<sup>7</sup> The producers of other drugs, such as LSD, and methamphetamines are many. These drugs are produced throughout the world and sold illegally in the United States.<sup>8</sup>

The categories of individuals that participate in actual trafficking and smuggling of illegal drugs are numerous. They include the growers, producers and drivers (or carriers) who collectively provide drugs to the dealers on the street. They all experience immense profit from the sale of these drugs and therefore the participants feel that it is worth the risk. Illegal drug trafficking has become a big business and continues to be very profitable over the years. This makes it easy for the big drug organizations to acquire technology, and sophisticated equipment used in other markets, such as growing and transportation. Sometimes, the equipment used to protect their product is as technically advanced as the equipment employed by agencies that are trying to disband them. Figure 1 highlights the production of drugs and their flow into the United States.

#### Host Nation Cooperation

The United States Government depends on other countries to assist in stopping the flow of illegal drugs into the United States and throughout the world. The countries involved in the

growing, producing, or transporting of these drugs are asked to take appropriate measures to eliminate the problem within their own borders. This can be accomplished by attempting to stop the cultivation, production and exportation of illegal drugs as well as the reduction of domestic demand. Each year the President of the United States makes a determination as to which countries are cooperating fully to achieve the goals set forth by the United Nations during the 1988 Drug Convention.<sup>9</sup>

Countries which do not cooperate fully with the United States, or which do not take adequate steps on their own to fight drugs can lose potential assistance and can cause the United States to vote "no" for any international loans to that country. The President of the United States is required to review the performances of illicit drug producing countries and notify Congress of their compliance as good partners in December under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. They are judged on their actions in stemming cultivation and production, extraditing drug traffickers, and taking legal steps and law enforcement measures to prevent and punish public corruption that facilitates drug trafficking or impedes prosecution of drug related crimes.<sup>10</sup>

On 28 February 1997 President Clinton announced his list of those countries which have been certified as fully cooperating with the United States. He also announced those countries who were not certified as cooperating with the United States in the fight against drugs. Columbia was judged to be not cooperating for the second year in a row. There were twenty-three countries certified as cooperating fully and six identified as not cooperating. Mexico was certified as cooperating despite the recent allegations that top Mexican officials have been bribed to protect major drug lords.



Figure 1. The Flow of Illegal Drugs into the United States.

### Corruption

As stated earlier, the illegal drug market yields big dollars. This makes it very profitable for everyone involved, from the grower of the coca plant and the opium poppy to the dealer on the street. As long as the demand stays high, the supply will be there.<sup>11</sup> The high profits yielded by the market, facing an intensified counterdrug program, leads to drug-related corruption.

Corruption can be discovered in the highest levels of government in those countries whose populace depend largely on the income from illegal drugs. Government corruption due to illegal drugs, especially in Latin American countries, has risen in recent years as the market has become more profitable. Corruption is the most difficult aspect of the "drug war" to control because it can affect law enforcement at all levels, as well as officials in countries along the drug route.

Manuel Noriega, the former Panamanian President, protected the Colombian drug lord, Pablo Escobar, and committed other drug crimes. This is one notable example of government corruption (crimes leading to U.S. Operation Just Cause.) In February 1997 the recently appointed Commissioner of the National Counternarcotics Institutes of Mexico, General Gutierrez Rebollo, was arrested after an internal military investigation revealed that he had ties with Mexico's Juarez Drug Cartel. Mexico and Panama are two of the United States' closest neighbors and Noriega and Rebollo, former government officials of these countries, allowed or assisted drugs to be smuggled from their countries into the United States.

In most Latin American countries, members of the military and law enforcement officials make poor wages by United States standards. They are easy targets for bribes by illegal drug agents. In some cases, the only thing that an official would have to do to earn a bribe is just look the other way. Senior officers in Peru make less than \$300 a month. For \$70,000 such an officer can look the other way and make twenty times the annual military or police wages. Government officials who are likely to be susceptible to bribery or payoffs may influence a superior so that they



can be assigned to those duties that are counterdrug related.<sup>12</sup>

Corruption can effect whole governmental infrastructures. This can undermine any successes that a country may have in controlling the drug problem. For example, military equipment that was loaned to Bolivia by the United States for counterdrug efforts was used by the country's military to transport drugs and chemicals to drug production sites.<sup>13</sup>

### Domestic Threat

The production of illegal drugs within the borders of the United States is an added problem for local law enforcement agencies. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and other law enforcement agencies (LEAs) are fighting a two-front war when it come to illegal drugs. "Crack Houses" may potentially be found in any house in any neighborhood. Because of this, they are hard to locate without assistance from local citizens.

Cannabis cultivation is one of the biggest businesses in the United States and, in general, like crack, it can be found in almost any of neighborhood throughout the United States. This plant can be grown anywhere; in back yards, basements, closets and more elaborate home-made growing rooms. This type of illegal operation is more of the norm than large crop cultivation. Although not a great threat individually, the number of illegal growers are increasing.

Another big problem for LEAs is the large crops of marijuana grown throughout the United States, many times on Federal property (parks and forest). Growers tend to locate areas that are infrequently used and fully vegetated so that their crops are not detected and cannot be associated with specific individuals.

The marijuana growers are taking the risk of prosecution because the amount of money that can be made on growing and selling marijuana outweighs the risk of going to jail. In 1979 this had become an estimate \$13 billion a year US cash crop with a retail value of \$20-\$30 billion a

year.<sup>14</sup> In 1997 it is still estimated to be the number one cash crop in the United States yielding an estimated \$20-\$40 billion yearly. It is also estimated that marijuana is grown in every state in the United States and one ounce can cost as much as an ounce of gold.<sup>15</sup> Twenty years ago marijuana cultivation in the United States was very rare and it was usually grown by "hippies" and other individuals for their own use. Now it is grown for sale and profit.

As an example of the growing problem within the United States, Operation Green Sweep, a joint DEA and military operation, was conducted in July of 1990 in northern California. Citizens of Humboldt County were growing marijuana on federal property. The task force covered 65,000 acres of mountains and beaches. The operation eradicated 1,400 marijuana plants at 28 growing sites. The estimated value of the eradicated plants was \$2.8 million. In short marijuana was a major cash crop (\$500 million annually ) for Humboldt County.<sup>16</sup>

Retired General Barry McCaffery, the newly appointed "Drug Czar" (i.e., head the Office of National Drug Control Policy - ONDCP), has been criticized for losing the drug war within the United States--as have been his predecessors. During the 1996 elections, the state of California voted to legalize the use of marijuana for medical purposes. Although California is not the first state to legalize the use of marijuana (Arizona and Virginia have also legalized marijuana for that purpose), it has gotten the most intense recent attention.<sup>17</sup>

There is a special concern in regard to United States government corruption. This concern can further be extended to front-line military conducting counterdrug operations as well as the DLEAs. With the increase in military support in counterdrug operations, there has been concern that a greater military role may lead to corruption within operational units. Continued success in these operations can lead to internal corruption within other United States federal agencies.<sup>18</sup>

The growing threat of illegal drugs is one that is affecting all Americans. The cultivation, production, and transportation of these drugs are not only happening outside the United States, but

they are also happening within the borders of United States. As illegal drugs become more and more a big business, government corruption becomes a major challenge for those who are depending on cooperation to fight against illegal drugs.

The next chapter will address the employment of the military in fighting the drug war and how its counterdrug role has developed as the United States attempts to fight the "war on drugs."

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<sup>1</sup>U.S. Department of State, "Licit and Illegal Drugs, 1977," Consumer Union Report [on-line]. Available: [www.calyx.nex/~schaffer/LIBRARY/histdrug.html](http://www.calyx.nex/~schaffer/LIBRARY/histdrug.html).

<sup>2</sup>U.S. Department of Justice, Drugs, Crime, and the Justice System: A National Report From the Bureau of Justice Statistics (Washington: Office of Justice Program, 1992), 2-8.

<sup>3</sup>Joint Pub 3-07.4, Joint Counterdrug Operations (Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1994), II-2.

<sup>4</sup>Jaime Malamud-Goti, Smoke and Mirrors (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 2.

<sup>5</sup>Joint Pub 3-07.4, Joint Counterdrug Operations (Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1994), II-4.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid.

<sup>7</sup>Joint Pub 3-07.4, II-6.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., II-7.

<sup>9</sup>White House Press Release Narcotics Control Fact Sheet (1997) [on-line]. Available: [library.whitehouse.gov/Retrieve.cgi?dbtype=text&id=7909&query=COUNTER+DRUG+COOPERATION](http://library.whitehouse.gov/Retrieve.cgi?dbtype=text&id=7909&query=COUNTER+DRUG+COOPERATION).

<sup>10</sup>Ibid.

<sup>11</sup>Economic Law of Supply and Demand: Quantity demanded increases when price falls and quantity demanded decreases when price rises, other things held constant. The amount of supplies offered depends on the price of the goods, the price of the inputs used to produce the goods, the price of related production, the availability of technology, the expectation of the products and the number of firms producing the products. Keynes's Law: Demand creates its own supply; that is, demand for goods and services creates an equal production of these goods and services.

<sup>12</sup>Gabriel Marcella, ed., Warriors in Peacetime: The Military and Democracy in Latin America, (Great Britain: Bookcraft Ltd, 1994), 74.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., 75.

<sup>14</sup>William W. Mendel, "Illusive Victory: From Blast Furnace to Green Sweep," Military Review 12 (December 1992): 74-87.

<sup>15</sup>Peter Jennings, Reports: Pot of Gold, (tape on hand) (New York: ABC News, 1997).

<sup>16</sup>Mendel, Blast Furnace to Green Sweep, 74-87.

<sup>17</sup>Jamie Dettmer and Sammy Linebaugh, "McCaffrey's No-Win War on Drugs," Insight on the News 13 (February 1997), 8-11.

<sup>18</sup>Peter Reuter, Gordon Crawford, and Jonathan Cave, Sealing the Borders (Santa Monica: Rand Corp., 1988), 2.

### CHAPTER 3

#### THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY AND HOW IT HAS DEVELOPED

As the United States entered the 1990s, illegal drugs had become the cause for well over fifty percent of the crimes committed in the United States.<sup>1</sup> The media, and in particular, television, displayed more and more graphically the effects that illegal drugs were having on society. People, including children, died from drug overdoses, were shot in the streets or were involved in some other drug related incidents with increasing frequency and visibility.

As drug problems escalated, the United States attempted to face these problems and change the military's role as well. Congress took several measures to increase the level of military support between 1981 and 1989 by passing several federal acts. The Department of Defense (DOD) was given a primary mission. Table 2 provides a chronological listing of the legislation and actions taken by the federal administration that effected military support to Drug Law Enforcement Agencies (DLEAs) and the counterdrug effort. Prior to 1981, the military's participation in counterdrug operation was limited and restricted due to the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878. This act restricted the use of federal forces to enforce public law. Just as illegal drugs were becoming more and more of a problem, internal and external to the United States, Congress passed the Military Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials Act in 1981. Published as Title 10, Chapter 18, of the U.S. Code, this act allowed for military, active and reserve, to collaborate with civilian law enforcement agencies. In particularly, it opened the door for the military to assist

in counterdrug operations.<sup>2</sup> This act became public law in 1986 and it included four sections which enabled the military to provide additional support as required:

Section 371 allows information collected during military operations to be provided to Federal, State or local civil law enforcement officials that may be relevant to a violation of any Federal or State law within the jurisdiction of that official.

Section 372 allows the military to make available equipment base facility or research facilities to Federal, State or local civilian law enforcement officials for law enforcement purposes.

Section 373 allows members of the military to train Federal, State, and local civilian law enforcement officials in the operation and maintenance of equipment made available under section 372.

Section 374 allows the Department of Defense to provide personnel to operate and maintain or assist in the operating and maintaining equipment made available under section 372 upon request.<sup>3</sup>

In 1982, in an address to the Department of Justice, President Reagan declared a "war on drugs." This time the President's administration acted by employing almost every Federal agency, including the military, in behalf of this effort.<sup>4</sup> Since then, the United States military's involvement in counterdrug operations has taken various forms, specifically in a support role.

The Military Cooperation With Law Enforcement Agency Act allowed the President and Congress to enlist the military's assistance in counterdrug operations without breaking the limitations imposed by the Posse Comitatus Act. This act did not remove the limitations from performing any law enforcement activities, but it did allow the federal military to support law enforcement agencies. Congress wanted to use the military in a support role without totally eliminating the Posse Comitatus Act. The counterdrug assistance role allowed the military to provide such things as reconnaissance, training, border operations, equipment loans and intelligence on drug traffickers, to DLEAs and host nations.

In 1986 President Reagan issued National Security Decision Directive 221 declaring that drug trafficking was a threat to national security and the first Anti-Drug Abuse Act was published

during 1986 by Congress. Both of these acts gave the Executive Branch more authority to fight the war on drugs.<sup>5</sup> This also meant an increase in military involvement in counterdrug operations.

Table 2

Chronology of Legislation Affecting  
Military Support

Date	Act or Action	Military's Role
1878	Posse Comitatus Act	Limited military involvement in law enforcement activities.
1981	Military Cooperation With Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies Act	Allowed Federal military, active and reserve, to collaborate with civilian LEA.
1986	National Security Decision Directive	Increased military support especially outside of the United States.
1986	Anti-Drug Abuse Act	Empowered the Executive Branch to use the military more to fight the "war on drugs."
1987	National Drug Policy Board (NDPB)	Provided a central coordinating agency for requesting military support.
1988	New Anti-Drug Abuse Act	Improved the coordination of Federal agencies including the military in the counterdrug effort especially international and domestic law enforcement.
1988	Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) established (replaced NDPB)	Established by the new Anti-Drug Abuse Act under it own director to unify the efforts more than 30 federal agencies.
1989	National Defense Authorization Act	Provided the United States military its detection and monitoring mission.
1989	National Drug Control Strategy published	Provided the President's strategy for military support to counter the United States drug situation. (A new Strategy is now published yearly.)

The National Drug Policy Board (NDPB) was established under the leadership of the Attorney General in 1987 by Executive Order 12590 by the President. The NDPB assumed the responsibility for coordinating the Federal counterdrug effort. In 1988 the new Anti-Drug Abuse

Act replaced the NDPB with the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) under the leadership of its own director. The ONDCP was established to provide a coherent national policy to unify the more than thirty Federal agencies, which include the military, and innumerable state and local authorities.<sup>6</sup> The ONDCP published its first National Drug Control Strategy in 1989. The Strategy is a comprehensive program of counterdrug actions employing a multinational and multiagency approach to the drug program.<sup>7</sup>

#### Federal Drug Law Enforcement Agencies

There are several other Federal agencies empowered by Congress to focus heavily on stopping the flow of illegal drugs into and throughout the United States. They were organized under the title of Drug Law Enforcement Agencies (DLEAs). Members of the DLEAs include but are not limited to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), U.S. Customs Service (USCS), the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), U.S. Border Patrol (USBP), and the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI). These agencies work closely together to apprehend drug traffickers and offenders with the support of the United States military.

In most cases, the DEA serves as the lead agency.<sup>8</sup> However, the government agency that is responsible to oversee all counterdrug operations to include the supervision of the DEA, FBI, and USBP is the Department of Justice (DOJ).<sup>9</sup>

Still, with dwindling local and state funds to fight the drug war and an increase in drug related criminal acts, local and state agencies are currently finding it difficult to continue their domestic drug fight without assistance from the military. The National Guard, both Army and Air Force components, are available to provide assistance to state and local law enforcement authorities in counterdrug operations. They provide a primary source of military support for local operations. These agencies are funded under Title 32 of the U.S. Code, which does not impose the



same restrictions as Federally controlled Title 10 funds and Title 18 (Posse Comitatus Act) restrictions.<sup>10</sup>

### Military Mission

The primary counterdrug mission for the military is detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs. This is the only mission in which the military is the lead agency. Detection and monitoring is the key to successful interdiction by other Federal Agencies. Support missions that may be assigned to the military are categorized as operational and nonoperational support. The two categories of support are distinguished by with or without troops; operational is with troops and nonoperational is without. Military units perform border patrols, provide training, and lease or loaning equipment to LEAs. The categories of support will be discussed further in chapter 4.

### Joint Task Forces

The military provides its support through three Department of Defense Joint Task Force (JTF) organizations established to coordinate military assistance to the DLEAs. Joint Task Force 4 (JTF-4), located in Key West, Florida; JTF-5 located in Alameda, California; and JTF-6 located in El Paso, Texas.<sup>11</sup> Since their establishment, JTF-4 has been renamed Joint Interagency Task Force East (JIATF-East) and JTF-5 has been renamed Joint Interagency Task Force West (JIATF-West). These three JTFs are subordinate organizations of a Unified Command and are assigned the areas of responsibility within the unified command's area of responsibility.

JIATF-East (formally JTF-4), located in Key West, Florida, falls under the direct control of U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM). The area of responsibility for JIATF-East is the Atlantic Ocean, Eastern Pacific (east of 92 degrees West Longitude), and the Caribbean Sea. Its mission is

to coordinate surveillance detection and monitoring of the air and sea approaches to the United States and to assist the DLEAs to reduce the flow of drugs and other contraband from Latin America.<sup>12</sup>

JIATF-West (formally JTF-5), which is now located in Alameda, California, falls under the responsibility of U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM). The area of responsibility for JIATF-West is the Western Pacific (west of 92 degrees West Longitude). Their mission is the detection and monitoring of illicit drugs coming into the United States from Southeast and Southwest Asia.

JTF-6 is also responsible to USACOM but comes under direct responsibility of U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM). JTF-6 has not been renamed or relocated as in JTF-4 and 5. It supports the DLEAs domestic operations. Its original area of responsibility was the United States southwestern border. This task force is now responsible for the entire United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. This includes the use of the active, reserve, and National Guard forces. Although the National Guard is called upon for state requirements, it can also be tasked by DOD for support and assigned to JTF-6. JTF-6 conducted 122 missions during just the first three quarters of 1996.<sup>13</sup> During 1995, the Marine Corps participated in seventy-four counterdrug missions in support of Joint Task Force Six (JTF-6).<sup>14</sup>

#### Rules of Engagement and Posse Comitatus

The rules of engagement for military units participating in counterdrug operations are restricted to peacetime rules of engagement. While participating in domestic operations, military units participating in detection and monitoring, as well as assisting the DLEAs, are still bound by

the limitations of the Posse Comitatus Act. However, military personnel have the right to defend themselves and members of their unit, LEA officers, or innocent bystanders with the minimum force necessary. Deadly force can only be used as a last resort. The restrictions of the Posse Comitatus Act, as stated earlier still apply.

The Posse Comitatus Act only applies to domestic affairs. The rules of engagement abroad may differ depending on the operations and the country in which United States military forces are involved.

This act restricts the use of the United States military in domestic affairs to enforce public law. It prohibits the military from being directly involved in law enforcement duties such as arrest, search, seizure, interdiction of aircraft, vessels or vehicles. It also prohibits the use of military personnel for surveillance, pursuit, and serving as informants, undercover agents, or investigation of any civilian legal matters.<sup>15</sup> Although this act tends to limit military participation in domestic civil affairs, under Constitutional provisions, military forces can be used to support other Federal civilian agencies in domestic situations. The Military Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Agency Act, passed by Congress in 1981 expanded military participation in counterdrug efforts.<sup>16</sup> The DOD Authorization Act further provided exceptions concerning military support provide to Law Enforcement Agencies to fight illegal drugs.

The United States military began its participation in counterdrug operations less than two decades ago. It was employed to fight the drug war because of the United States' need to protect its national security. All missions which the military performs are controlled and restricted by law, and the role that military forces play in the drug effort is primarily a support role. However, the military has one lead agency mission in detection and monitoring. The next chapter discusses the military's counterdrug capabilities.

- <sup>1</sup>Bureau of Justice Statistics, Drugs, Crime, and the Justice System (Washington: U.S. Department of Justice, 1992), 1-8.
- <sup>2</sup>U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps, FM 100-19/FMFM 7-10, Domestic Support Operations (Washington: Headquarters Department United States Marine Corps, 1993), 1-3.
- <sup>3</sup>Joint Pub 3-07.4, Joint Counterdrug Operation (Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1994), B-1.
- <sup>4</sup>Steven Wisotsky, Breaking the Impasse in the War on Drugs (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986),
- <sup>5</sup>Joint Pub 3-07.4, I-1.
- <sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*, I-2.
- <sup>7</sup>*Ibid.*
- <sup>8</sup>Murl D. Munger and William W. Mendel, Campaign Planning and the Drug War (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, 1991), 2.
- <sup>9</sup>William W. Mendel and Murl D. Munger, "Strategic Planning and the Drug Threat: A Joint Study Initiative," External Draft (Ft. Leavenworth: Foreign Military Studies Office, 1996), 6.
- <sup>10</sup>Joint Pub 3-07, III-39.
- <sup>11</sup>Munger and Mendel, Campaign Planning and the Drug War, 3.
- <sup>12</sup>Mendel and Munger, "Strategic Planning and the Drug Threat," 30.
- <sup>13</sup>*Ibid.*, 28.
- <sup>14</sup>U.S. Marine Corps, 1996. Chapter 3, "Current Operations 3-56 Counterdrug Operations. In Concepts & Issues 1996" [on line]. Available: [www.usmc.mil/r-c&196/concepts.htm](http://www.usmc.mil/r-c&196/concepts.htm).
- <sup>15</sup>FM 100-19/FMFM 7-10, 1-3, 3-1.
- <sup>16</sup>*Ibid.*, 1-3.

## CHAPTER 4

### MILITARY CAPABILITIES

There are two categories of military capabilities that will be discussed in regards to military participation in the counterdrug role. The first category includes current capabilities as directed by law and physical ability. This category includes all of the functions which the United States government authorizes the military to perform in support of Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs). It also includes the physical ability of the military to perform the missions that it is assigned.

The second category deals with the military's potential capabilities. This category includes the capabilities that the military has to perform an increased role if given the authority by Congress. This category will include the physical ability of the military to perform an increased role in counterdrug operations.

#### Current Capabilities

Under the current laws, the Department of Defense (DOD) is very capable of conducting any counterdrug mission it may be assigned. When Congress removed some of the limitations imposed upon the Federal military enabling it to support LEAs, they authorized several ways in which the military could support LEAs in counterdrug operations. There are two categories of support that can be provided and within the law: nonoperational and operational. Nonoperational support, which provides no direct military personnel involvement, is support in the form of leasing or lending equipment without operators, transfer of equipment, use of training facilities and areas,

or other support by the services. This support is also be provided to other nations abroad.

Operational support is provided to LEAs and HNs in the form of military personnel and their equipment and training provided by the military personnel.<sup>1</sup>

The primary lead agency mission of DOD, detection and monitoring, is categorized as operational support to the counterdrug effort. This mission can be assigned to just about any level of military unit. Most units possess the skills and equipment to perform reconnaissance, surveillance, communication, and control at one level or another.<sup>2</sup>

When we look at the capabilities that the United States military forces have to support the President's National Drug Control Strategy, each individual service brings its own unique capabilities. The Army and Marine Corps are able to support land operations with ground forces. The Navy provides maritime detection and monitoring support, while the Air Force provides aerial detection and monitoring support. In some cases, the services can overlap in their capabilities and type of support that they provide. The Army, Navy and Marine Corps are able to provide aerial support when necessary. Also, the Army and the Marine Corps can provide some maritime support. Some of the types of equipment within the inventory that can be used in counterdrug operations is discussed in detail in Appendix A.

#### The Lead Agency Mission

The specific mission of detection and monitoring is only a part of the overall interdiction process. While the interdiction process is a multienvironment and multiagency activity, the detection and monitoring phase is a first step. It is essential and an important part of the entire four phase process.<sup>3</sup>

The success of detection and monitoring phase which leads to the success of the four additional phases of interdiction:<sup>4</sup> The additional phases are as follows:

1. Sorting legitimate traffic from that which might be illegal.
2. Intercepting potential smugglers.
3. Searching potential smugglers.
4. Arresting smugglers for violating the law.

Title 10, Chapter 18, Section 124 of the US Code states that if a vessel or an aircraft is detected outside the borders or outside the littorals of the United States, DOD personnel may begin or continue pursuit of that aircraft over the land and or vessel into the littorals of the United States. If that aircraft or vessel is detected within the United States, DOD personnel must direct that vessel or aircraft to go to a location designated by appropriate civilian officials.

There are three environments in which illegal drug traffickers can be detected; air, maritime and land.

1. **Air Interdiction.** This is a major means by which illegal drugs are transported into the United States. The United States goal is to deter drug smuggling by seizing drugs, aircraft, and the smugglers by denying smugglers safe, direct and economical routes to major distribution areas in the United States. This area is monitored by air forces.

2. **Maritime Interdiction.** Primarily the responsibility of the Coast Guard, although Navy vessels are also involved. The focus of this environment is on deterring drug smuggling by monitoring seaborne smuggling routes, detecting and seizing drug smuggling vessels and arresting their crews.

3. **Land Interdiction.** Land interdiction is not just related to deterring and seizing illegal drug traffic, but also drug-related money, illegal munitions and essential chemicals as they enter and leave the United States.<sup>5</sup> Along the United States border, this role is usually performed by military ground forces.

## Research and Development

The detection and monitoring mission, which can also be called surveillance, was given to DOD because the military has experience in using the state-of-art, highly technical, equipment that already is in the military's inventory. This equipment is used to detect and control sophisticated weapon systems in combat situations. This highly technical equipment can be easily employed against smugglers when not being used for its original purpose. However, in the midst of receiving this mission, the Secretary of Defense was directed by congress to improve the detection and monitoring system of the armed forces to support this mission. This meant that they had to develop a system that was capable of detecting potential traffickers and distinguishing them from commercial air and maritime traffic.

The National Defense Authorization Act first authorized DOD research and development funding for counterdrug program in fiscal year 1990. These funds were to be devoted to improve technology that would enhance DOD's detection and monitoring role and improve the ability to detect illicit drugs and other dangerous substances concealed in containers.<sup>6</sup> The DOD research and development capabilities exceed those of LEA. DOD can integrate the research and development process so that operational requirements can better be defined, validated and prioritized. They can better screen, develop and pursue scientific and engineering solutions to these requirements. The DOD budget can also support the newly developed equipment logistically because logistics support is part of the research and development process.<sup>7</sup> LEAs tend to rely on DOD to perform most of the counterdrug research and development because of the capabilities mentioned earlier, while directing their funds to other operational needs.<sup>8</sup>

The 1996 National Drug Control Strategy provided the Department of Defense (DOD), specifically, with four hundred thirty two million dollars in the fiscal year 1997 budget for the counternarcotics effort. These funds are provided to "reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the



United States by encouraging reduction in foreign production, combating international traffickers and reducing demand at home.”<sup>9</sup> One-fifth of the DOD drug budget goes to support detection and monitoring, reconnaissance and other services in countries such as Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru.

### Training Opportunities

By law, the assistance of military personnel and equipment in counterdrug operations and missions must not interfere with military preparedness. That can be looked at in two ways. First, counterdrug operations must not interfere with a unit’s ability to be prepared for the national security mission. Second, participating in counterdrug operations must not degrade unit personnel and equipment readiness. Training is part of that preparedness. The military constantly trains in peacetime to be prepared in war and there is no such thing as over-training or an over trained-unit.

To combine the two efforts, counterdrug operations and training, Congress passed Public Law 101-189, Section 1206, which directs that when practical, military units shall conduct training exercises, to include reserve training exercises, in drug interdiction areas. This area is any air environment area, land and sea, in which smuggling of drugs into the United States has occurred or believed to have occurred.<sup>10</sup>

### Actual Events

Operation Blast Furnace launched the first major United States military’s counterdrug campaign in 1986. It also incorporated forces of the Bolivian government’s police force. The mission for the operation was to arrest major drug dealers and dismantle laboratories.<sup>11</sup> The participants in this joint operation were the DEA, United States military, and the Bolivian Police (Rural Area Police Patrol Unit, also known as UMOPAR).

During the operation, the United States military role was to provide logistics support to the UMOPAR in an effort to find and destroy coca producing facilities in the region of the Chapare.

The United States provided 160 support personnel and six Black Hawk helicopters for air mobility.<sup>12</sup> The operation was determined to be unsuccessful because it failed to accomplish the mission. No arrests were made and no laboratories were dismantled.

Military experts determined that the failure of this operation was due to three major factors. First, there was a leak of the operation that eliminated the element of surprise and allowed traffickers to elude the forces sent after them. Second, traffickers easily identified the aircraft used in the operation which led them to anticipate the move. Third, there were rifts among United States forces, Drug Enforcement Agency, and the Bolivian UMOPAR regarding how the operation should have been carried out. They failed to stop any of the drug traffickers, thus failing in their efforts to curb exportation of cocaine to the United States. Blast Furnace did, however, curtail drug operations temporarily. As soon as the operation was over, things returned to normal. Two years later the support forces were replaced by soldiers of the U.S. Army Special Forces. Their mission was to provide training to the Leopardos (UMOPAR) in jungle warfare. This aided in future operations among the Bolivian forces, United States military forces, and Drug Law Enforcement Agencies (DLEAs).

Operation Green Sweep, conducted in the northern California forest of Humboldt County consisted of not only DLEA agents but members of the California National Guard and United States Regular Army personnel from the 7th Infantry Division.

The mission: Gather intelligence to identify cultivation sites and provide surveillance on the cultivation sites, and arrest suspects. Then eradicate and rehabilitate the sites.

Manpower: 110 California National Guard, 60 Regular Army and 60 DLEA agents.

Training opportunity: The National Guard did most of the planning for the operation and provided the administration and logistics support for the operation. 7th Infantry Division provided aircraft support and medical evacuation. This provided both the National Guard and the members of 7th Infantry Division the training opportunity.<sup>13</sup>

In 1992 an infantry company from 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, Camp Pendleton, California, under the command of a Marine captain, provided surveillance support to the California Law Enforcement Agency (LEA) in the Sequoia National Park. The LEA needed assistance in locating individuals who were growing marijuana in the park.

The mission: Surveillance, observation and reporting. Anything that was identified by the patrolling teams were to be reported back to the LEA.

Manpower: Five to ten patrols a day, two to three at a time.

Restrictions: The patrols were instructed not to intercept or engage any individuals found in the area. They were to report back everything.

Training opportunity: This unit, while performing a real-time mission, also obtained training for their wartime mission. They practiced patrolling techniques while performing an actual mission. While the patrols were out the rest of the unit conducted other tactical training in the park.<sup>14</sup>

#### Unified Commands Components

JIATF-East, JIATF-West, JTF-6 all are standing headquarters but they have no standing or permanent units assigned to them. These agencies are able to employ any unit assigned within their supported unified commander. The Commanders in Chief (CINC) of the Unified Commands, both United States Atlantic Command (USACOM) and United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) can assigns units, through their Service Component Commanders, to any of the Joint

Task Forces to support the current required mission. Forces can also be transferred between CINCs when required with the approval of the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF).

JTF-6 supports all DOD requirements to LEAs within the continental United States under USACOM. JTF-6 can support in operational, intelligence, ground support, engineer and rapid support mission. A description of these missions is provided in Appendix B. Most units assigned to JTF-6 to participate in counterdrug operations usually do so on a volunteer basis. These operations provide them an opportunity for real world experience that regular training exercises may not provide. JTF-6 also provides the funding to support all military units involved in counterdrug operations.

JIATF-East and West provide units the same opportunities however these operations take place outside of the United States. Counterdrug operations in which United States personnel are involved are conducted by the request of agreement of the host nation to the Unified Command. The United States military personnel provide the same support as provided under JTF-6 except these units are usually not volunteers. Detection and monitoring support can also be provided directly to the host nation LEA.

Throughout all of these operations, force protection must be maintained. The amount of money involved in the cultivation, production and trafficking of illegal drugs provides an incentive to the individual to remove who ever is in the way. This happens both inside and outside of the United States. Participating units, no mater the size, carry individual weapons and live rounds. The rules of engagement require that they are only used when their lives, members of their unit, DLEA personnel, and innocent by-standers are in danger.

### Potential Capabilities

In 1982 when Congress applied military support to the “war on drugs”, it did so because of the structure and experience it would bring to the fight. The United States military brings with it long experience in warfighting and organizational capabilities appropriate for large-scale multiagency activities. This experience covers the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of planning and maneuver and can be traced back to the Revolutionary War. While the “war on drugs” cannot be looked at as a war against an enemy that can be seen, it is a war against an enemy that is known. They know what it is and for the most part where it comes from. The military’s planning process includes intelligence gathering on enemy capabilities, and determining possible courses of actions for both enemy and friendly forces, coordinating maneuvers of friendly forces, and monitoring the enemy’s movements.

The Military Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Official Act (Title 10 Chapter 18 of US Code) opened the door for increased military support, but, it wasn’t until 1988 that DOD received a permanent mission in counterdrug operations. DOD became the sole lead agency in detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States. This came after a Senate Committee on Armed Services hearing in 1988 which revealed that giving the military an expanded role was a necessary response to the cocaine epidemic threat to the security of the United States.<sup>15</sup> Prior to that, the military participated in counterdrug operations in strictly supporting roles. Now the role was expanded to utilize more of its capabilities.

The United States military, though the most powerful military in the world, and an instrument of power that the United States uses to project its strength throughout the world, nevertheless, has limited powers and abilities when fighting the “war on drugs.” The Posse Comitatus Act, although amended, still ties DOD’s hands when it comes to exerting all that it has

to fight this war. As noted above, the one lead agency mission assigned to DOD, detection and monitoring, was assigned because of the cocaine threat coming from the Latin American. DLEAs require assistance to detect the trafficking of these drugs and to improve their interdiction capabilities. The military had this capability in equipment and experienced personnel. However, the military has other capabilities that are not tapped in the counterdrug effort.

The military is capable of assisting in law enforcement activities. All military police personnel are trained in law enforcement functions which they use on military installations. There are also many other military personnel who are trained to secure areas which can easily be related to law enforcement activities. These skills can be utilized to support local LEAs. They can be used to apprehend or detain individuals when assisting the Border Patrol and Customs officials instead of waiting for an official to come to the identified location.

Aviation components belonging to the US Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps and Army are capable of interdicting and downing unfriendly aircraft. This ability could be used in the interdiction of aircraft which may be carrying illegal drugs. Today, if an aircraft is detected over the United States soil, the military aircraft must notify officials who will direct the aircraft to land. That military aircraft is capable of following the suspected aircraft and forcing it to land if necessary.

The Navy is also capable of interdicting unfriendly ships and boats. In counterdrug operations the Navy can provide additional maritime interdiction capabilities by stopping suspected ships boats and seizing them if they are found to be carrying illegal drugs.

As stated earlier, the principal capability that DOD has is the ability to fight wars. If provided the authority, the "war on drugs" could be fought by the military just as decisively as it fights any other conventional war. This will mean engaging the "enemy"-- that is, any person or any vehicle in any situation-- as it would an enemy on the battlefield. In this case the world would

be the battlefield. Within the United States the Federal military, active and reserve, would be able to conduct a counterdrug operation without any limitation. Instead of providing DLEAs with just operational and nonoperational support they could provide tactical support. The military would be able to use whatever equipment, weapons, or units necessary to neutralize the situation.

Outside the United States the U.S. military could be called upon to assist any nation in eliminating its drug problem especially if the problem directly affects the United States. This could mean destroying laboratories, eradicating plants and even directly engaging drug cartels.

As a professional institution, DOD consist of almost one and one-half million well-educated and professional individuals (this figure does not include Reserve or National Guard forces). DOD and its military members are capable of establishing an anti-drug abuse campaign, educate the civilian populous on the perils of drug abuse. This is a potentially overlooked capability. In some states, the National Guard plays an important role in anti-drug education. However, the active and reserve forces are virtually an untapped source in providing drug abuse education to the national public.

The next chapter summarizes this thesis. It examines the overall threat and identifies the pros and cons of a change in the military's role based on comparing the threat of the illegal drugs situation to the military capabilities, thereby answering the thesis question.

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<sup>1</sup>Joint Pub 3-07.4, Joint Counterdrug Operations (Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1994), I-12.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>Joint Pub 3-07.4, Joint Counterdrug Operations (Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1994), IV-1.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., I-12.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., IV-1.

<sup>6</sup>United States General Accounting Office, Report to Congressional Requesters on Drug Control: Status Report on Counterdrug Technology Development, 1993, 12.

<sup>7</sup>Joint Pub 3-07.4, Joint Counterdrug Operations (Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1994), IV-42.

<sup>8</sup>United States General Accounting Office, Report to Congressional Requesters on Drug Control: Status Report on Counterdrug Technology Development, 1993, 4.

<sup>9</sup>The President, 1996, National Drug Control Strategy [on line]. Available: [www.ncjrs.org/textiles/strat96.text](http://www.ncjrs.org/textiles/strat96.text).

<sup>10</sup>Joint Pub 3-07.4, Joint Counterdrug Operations (Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1994), B-2.

<sup>11</sup>Jaime Malamud-Goti, Smoke and Mirrors (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 30.

<sup>12</sup>William W. Mendel, "Illusive Victory: From Blast Furnace to Green Sweep," Military Review 12 (December 1992): 74-87.

<sup>13</sup>Illusions of Victory., 82

<sup>14</sup>Major James L. Stalnaker, USMC, interview by author, 7 March 1997, tape recording, Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth.

<sup>15</sup>United States General Accounting Office, Report to Congressional Requesters on Drug Control: Heavy Investment in Military Surveillance Is Not Paying Off, 1993, 12.



## CHAPTER 5

### FUTURE ROLES OF THE MILITARY

The President declared that illegal drugs were a threat to the national security of the United States in 1986. As the United States approaches the new millennium it can be determined that the threat is still there and it appears to be largely unchanged or even increased. It is evident that the consumption of illegal drugs has severely increased over the last few decades.

It is difficult to measure success in this "war on drugs." The more that is done to stop illegal drugs from entering the United States, the more has to be done. When the President of the United States mobilized all Federal agencies to fight drugs, he did so because as a nation, the United States was losing and new approaches were required. The Department of Defense (DOD) had special qualifications needed to supplement with the other agencies if the United States was going to make process. It brought experience, technology, resources, and personnel. To attempt to withdraw the military from the counterdrug effort, in the author's view, would be detrimental to the United States.

Continuing the current military commitment to counterdrug operations could have some effect on the future of the military. However, when Congress gave the military the primary lead agency mission of detection and monitoring, it was with the stipulation that participation in counterdrug operations would not interfere with military preparedness. Participating in counterdrug operations can provide military units and individuals with valuable experience and with an opportunity to heighten military skills applicable to boarder activities. This is possible

because the major difference in counterdrug operations and combat operations are the rules of engagement.

Increasing the role or maximizing the use of the capabilities of the military at this time would not be in the best interest of the United States or the Department of Defense. Any action to this end would require legislative action to change existing laws and regulations. The Posse Comitatus Act would have to be modified or eliminated and the military would be authorized to take action at any time against United States citizens. When Congress outlined the services that the military could provide to assist Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs), it was careful not to infringe upon any restrictions imposed by authorizing the military to take direct action against United States citizens. It is the opinion of the author that the United States government and citizens are not ready to remove these restrictions.

The future personnel strength and financial resources of the military are still unknown at this time. Increasing the counterdrug role of the military by maximizing its capabilities to fight the war on drugs or by increasing the amount of annual operations would have a devastating effect on both personnel and equipment. Although funds are provided to support military units while they are participating in counterdrug operations, these funds are not provided for replacing equipment or recruiting additional personnel. Notwithstanding, counterdrug operations provide an excellent opportunity for units to train for their primary mission of maintaining the security of the United States, it cannot be a substitute for conventional training.

The military plays an important role in counterdrug operations. The effects of its participation are hard to measure at this time. However, if the military was to terminate its participation the effects would be evident. If the military deters an illegal drug-related event by its mere presence, then it has been effective.

Additional downsizing and budget reductions will have some effect on current and future operations, but these operations will not stop. Mr. Raymond Geoffroy, Head of Security and Law, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps writes:

As you know, past and current National Security Strategies have included countering the flow, distribution, and utilization of illegal drugs as a priority. Since we do not envision a change, the Marine Corps would continue to support that national security mission. It is difficult to forecast the actual impact on our ability to continue to support the counterdrug effort as we really don't know what the Marine Corps will look like in the future. The QDR process is ongoing - and we will probably only start to feel its implication in the year 2000.<sup>1</sup>

After looking at all of the evidence it can only be determined that the optimal role of the military in the year 2000 will be the role which it plays holds today; that is, maintain the status quo. That means, that no matter what the status of personnel and funding resources in the future, there will be military involvement in support of the President's National Drug Control Strategy.

#### Alternatives

The flow of drugs into and within the United States increases every year, a situation that has not changed since the United States military involvement in counternarcotics. But, this may not reflect on the success or failure of military involvement. Each military operation may be successful in some measure even if there were no traffickers or drug carrier were detected. That is, military counterdrug actions may have a deterrent effect.

There are several alternatives to an increase in military involvement in the counterdrug effort. First, the Drug Law Enforcement Agencies (DLEAs) can be better equipped and better staffed to increase their capabilities. The limitations placed on DOD by the Posse Comitatus Act are not imposed on DLEAs. Second, the Federal Government could sponsor more education programs and to intensify its anti-drug abuse program targeted toward children and young adults. This would definitely be in line with the President's National Drug Control Strategy. It may reduce adolescent and drug related violence and addiction among youth. The military could also be

involved in this program without increasing its role or violating any current laws. Third, there should be stiffer sentences for those offenders who are caught cultivating, producing, trafficking and selling illegal drugs within the United States. Many of the offenders are repeaters, who continue to participate in illegal drug acts because the risk of getting caught does not out-weigh the money that they can make. DLEAs and Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) often fight the same criminals. This would raise the stakes for those who persist on participating in illegal drug acts.

In conclusion, the military plays an important role in the United States counterdrug effort. Although its effects are difficult to measure, the military's participation continues to be necessary to protect the security of the United States. In that respect, it is imperative that the military maintain its current counterdrug role as it approaches the new millennium in accordance with the law and future resources.

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<sup>1</sup>Raymond Geoffroy, E-Mail Interview on, Counterdrug Operations, (Washington, D.C.: 1997).

## APPENDIX A

### DESCRIPTION OF MAJOR EQUIPMENT USED IN COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS

Airborne Platforms provide height for visual search, reconnaissance or surveillance missions. The advantage to airborne platforms in counterdrug operations are speed, flexibility and rapid reaction. However they sometime have to rely on other platforms for interception and apprehensions. The following airborne platforms are used in counterdrug operations.

1. E-3 Sentry (AWACS) - (United States Air Force (USAF)). This is an early warning and command and control aircraft based on the Boeing 707 airframe. It is equipped with a surveillance radars with detection ranges of over 200 nautical miles (nm). It can datalink radars information to a ground site, and can also provide close control to United States military interceptor aircraft.

2. P-3 Orion - (United States Navy (USN), United States Custom Service (USCS)). This is a fixed-wing, multi-engine, turboprop, Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA). It is capable of maritime surface radars search and electronic surveillance. A Navy variant of this aircraft is it's counterdrug update which includes several roll-on/roll-off systems that has been configured especially for the counterdrug mission. It has a maximum speed of 411 knots, a maximum range of over 400 nm and a maximum endurance of over 11 hours

3. E-2 Hawkeye - (USN). This aircraft is carrier capable, Airborne Early Warning aircraft capable of detecting air and maritime target out to 260 nm. Capable of surveillance with

IFF interrogation and data link. Maximum speed is 323 knots, maximum range is 1394 nm, and maximum endurance is 6 hours.

4. S-3 Viking - (USN). This is a carrier capable, fixed-wing, twin turbofan ASW aircraft used in an MPA role for counterdrug missions. The maximum speed is 450 kts and the maximum range is over 2000 nm which can be extended through aerial refueling. Capabilities include surface radars search, electronic surveillance, Forward-Looking Infrared (FLIR), and HF and UHF communications.

5. F-14 Tomcat - (USN). This is a two seat, twin turbofan, carrier based fighter, with maximum speed of over mach 2, and combat radius of 325 nm which can be extended with aerial refueling. It plays an inceptor role and is equipped with an air-to- air search and tracking radars with IFF capability, infrared (IR) seeker, TV tracker, and UHF communications.

6. F-15 Eagle - (USAF/Air National Guard (ANG)). This is a single-seat, single engine, turbofan air-to-air or air-to-ground fighter with a maximum speed of over mach 2, and a combat radius of 425 nm which can be extended through aerial refueling. It is equipped with an air-to-air search and tracking radars with IFF capability, and UHF communications. This aircraft plays an inceptor role in counterdrug operations.

7. F-16 Fighting Falcon - (USAF/ANG). This is a single seat, single engine turbofan air-to-air or air-to ground fighter with a maximum speed of over mach 2, and a combat radius of 425 nm which can be extended through aerial refueling. It is equipped with an air-to-air search and track radars with IFF capability and UHF communications. This aircraft play an inceptor role in counterdrug operations.

8. F/A-18 Hornet - (USN, United States Marine Corps (USMC) & Canadian Forces). The Hornet is a single seat, twin-turbofan, strike fighter. It has a maximum speed of over mach 1.8 , and a combat radius of 350 nm which can be extended through aerial refueling. It is equipped

with multi-mode air-to-air and air-to-ground search and tracking radars and VHF and UHF communications. It operates as an interceptor role in counterdrug operations.

9. RC-12G Crazy Horse - (USA). This is a variant of the Beechcraft Super King Air used by the US Customs Service which is a twin-turboprop general aviation light transport aircraft with a maximum speed of 260 kts and a range of over 1600 nm. The Crazy Horse is used for counterdrug electronic surveillance.

10. U-2R/TR-1 - (USAF). These are single seat, single turbojet, high altitude reconnaissance and research aircraft, with a maximum speed of 373 kts, and a maximum range of over 2600 nm, and a maximum endurance of 12 hours. It is equipped with a variety of electronic and optical and sensors.

11. Pioneer Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) - (USMC/USA/USN). This is an unmanned aerial reconnaissance vehicle that has a maximum speed of 100 kts, and a maximum range of 100 nm, and a maximum endurance of 6 to 9 hours. It maybe ground or shipboard operated, and carries a television camera payload for visual surveillance and reconnaissance.

12. HC-130H AEW Hercules - (USAF). This a variant of the Hercules, it is a fixed-wing, four engine turboprop aircraft, with a maximum speed of 354 kts, a maximum range of 3600 nm, and a maximum endurance of 11 hours. It is equipped with search radar, and HF, VHF, and UHF communications platform.

13. AC-130 H Spectre - (USAF). The AC-130 is a fixed-wing, four engine, turboprop, special operations aircraft. It is used for surveillance in the counterdrug role. It has FLIR and low light level television (LLLTV) sensors. It has a maximum range of approximately 1000 nm, and maximum endurance of five hours which can be extended through aerial refueling.

14. AC-130 Hercules - (USAF). The C-130 is a fixed-wing, four engine, turboprop aircraft. It is used by the Air Force and can be used in a variety of configurations in a counterdrug role.

15. OV-1D Mohawk (USA). This a fixed-wing, twin-turboprop observation aircraft, with a maximum speed of 265 kts, a maximum range o 1155 nm and a maximum endurance of 4.5 to 5 hours. It is equipped with side looking aircraft radar (SLAR) or FLIR, and UHF communications.

16. H-60 Blackhawk/Seahawk/Jayhawk/Pavehawk (USA/USCS/USN/United States Coast Guard/USAF). This is a twin-turbine, combat assault transport helicopter, with a maximum speed of 180 kts, a range of over 720 nm and an endurance of up to 6 hours. Capabilities include surface search radar and FLIR.

17. HH-65 Dolphin - (USCG). This is a twin-turbine general purpose helicopter, with a maximum speed of 165 kts, and a maximum range of 400 nm, and a maximum endurance of 4 hours.

18. HU-25 Guardian - (USCG. This a modified twin turbofan, fixed-wing general aviation jet with a speed of approximately 350 kts, a 2045 nm range, and an endurance of 5 hours. It is equipped with a 160 nm range surface search radar. Further modified version (HU-25C), the air interdiction interceptor, includes an F-16 air search and tracking radar and a FLIR sensor.

19. RC-135 Rivet Joint - (USAF). This is a modified Boeing 707 aircraft. It can be used in a counterdrug role.

20. RF-4C Phantom II - (USAF). This aircraft is a variant of the F-4 Phantom II. It is equipped with a variety of sensors and can be used in counterdrug operations.

21. RU-21H Guardrail V - (USA). This aircraft can be flown in counterdrug operations.

22. RG-8A (USCG). The RG-8A is a single engine, low wing, fixed gear motor-glider monoplane. It is designed for day and night covert detection, classification, and surveillance and



maritime law enforcement targets. It has a 62 ft wingspan, specifically muffled engine and 100 gallon fuel load. It can operate virtually undetected at altitudes above 1000 ft for up to 10 hours with a maximum range of 900 nm at 95 kts. It has FLIR and videotaping, and night vision capabilities.

**Afloat Platforms.** Sea-based platforms provide counterdrug forces the advantages of mobility and high endurance. They operate in the air and maritime detection and monitoring roles.

1. **High Endurance Cutters (WHEC) - (USCG).** These 378 foot cutters have a maximum speed of 29 kts, and range of 14,000 nm. They are equipped with surface search radars and are capable of supporting a helicopter.

2. **Medium Endurance Cutters (WMEC) - (USCG).** These 210 to 270 foot cutters have a maximum speed of 15 to 19.5 kts and range from 6,100 to 9,500 nm. They are equipped with surface search radars and are capable of supporting a helicopter.

3. **Patrol Boats (WPB) - (USCG).** These patrol crafts are from 82 to 110 foot long with a maximum speed up to 26 kts and range from 1200 to 1900 nm. They are equipped with maritime navigation radars.

4. **Picket Ships - (USN).** US Navy cruisers, destroyers and frigates are used as radar picket ships to provide air and maritime search and surveillance. They typically have maximum speeds in excess of 30 knots and with underway refueling and replenishing, indefinite range and endurance. They are equipped with air and surface search radars and are capable of supporting a helicopter. On occasion, ships such as LHAs, LPDs and LSTs can be used to support air and maritime detection and monitoring missions.

5. **Modified Ocean Surveillance Ships (MOD T-AGOS) - (USN).** These are 224 foot ocean surveillance vessels with a speed of 11 kts that have been modified for counterdrug operations. They are equipped with an air search radar and are deployed in lieu of USN

combatants. They have low operating cost and long endurance on station which make these platforms optimum for detection and monitoring operations.

6. Submarines - (USN). US nuclear powered submarines can provide information on both sea and air traffic while remaining completely covert. Capable of speeds in excess of 20 kts, they have indefinite range and endurance. All have UHF satellite (SATCOM), as well as UHF line of sight.

Land Based Systems. Land based systems may be either fixed or mobile, depending on size and mission requirements. Advantages may include relative ease of operation and maintenance as opposed to air or sea borne systems. They are able to cover smuggling routes not easily covered by other systems.

1. Tethered Aerostat Radar Systems (TARS). This is a system of static, tethered balloons that carry radar sets to an altitude of 10,000 -15,000 mean sea level (MSL) which allow radar coverage out to approximately 160 nm. Aerostats cover the major drug smuggling routes along the United States border and into the Caribbean.

2. Joint Surveillance System (JSS). This is a joint North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)/Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) surveillance radar system used for air traffic control and surveillance of aircraft entering the within the North American airspace.

3. ATC Radar Augmentation. This is a NORAD initiative to integrate existing airport surveillance radars along the southern border of the United States into the NORAD surveillance system.

4. Over-the Horizon Backscatter (OTH-B) Radar - (USAF). The sole operational OTH-B site is the East Coast Radar Site (ECES) located at Bangor, Maine. It provides 180 degree all-altitude, wide area surveillance of air targets between 500 and 1800 nm from the transmission site in normal configuration and 500-3000 nm coverage in extended range configuration.

5. Relocatable Over the Horizon Radar (ROTHR) - (USN). This system is capable of providing wide area detection and surveillance of air targets up to 2000 nm from the site with real-time reporting of targets of interest via ADNET to appropriate agencies.

6. Ground Mobile Radars - (USAF, USMC, ANG, and Canadian Forces). These mobile radar sets provide primary or augment existing radar coverage and are capable of long range searches up to 240 nm, and height finding up to 95,000 ft.

7. Patriot Air Defense Missile System Radar - (USA). This system is a multi-function, phased array radar capable of surveillance, IFF interrogation, and tracking of low medium, and high altitude airborne targets.

8. Hawk Air Defense Missile System Radar - (US Army Reserve (USAR)/USMC). This system consists of an agile continuous wave acquisition radar (3-D) for surveillance and detection of airborne traffic.

9. Night Vision Device. These man-portable devices provide visual surveillance capabilities at night, based either on amplification of low levels of ambient light or by thermal imaging. They may be used by Department of Defense (DOD) personnel in support of Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) or they may be loaned to LEAs for their own use.

10. Ground Surveillance Radars (GSR) - (USA/USMC). Typically , small, man-portable radar sets capable of detecting vehicle and personnel traffic to a maximum range of 6 km.

11. Remote Ground Sensors - (USA/USMC/US Boarder Patrol (USBP)). Remote ground sensors are typically man-portable systems capable of detecting human or vehicular traffic using radar, infrared, seismic, magnetic, or pressure sensors. In the counterdrug role, they are employed along suspected smuggling routes, and automatically monitored from a remote location.

12. Caribbean Basin Radar Network (CBRN). This is a series of linked US owned or host nation radars, throughout the Caribbean which provide air surveillance information to

NORAD, United States Atlantic Command (USACOM), United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) and participating host nations.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Joint Pub 3-07.4, Joint Couterdrug Operations (Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1994), F-1 to F-7.

## APPENDIX B

### JOINT TASK FORCE SIX SUPPORT CAPABILITIES

The information in this appendix was taken from Joint Task Force Six: A Stronger Alliance. This booklet was written by JTF-6 as a guide to assist Law Enforcement Agencies when requesting assistance from the Department of Defense to support counterdrug operations.

#### **Operational Missions:**

**Aviation Operations.** Average length of operation is twenty-one days. A significant force multiplier when combined with ground forces.

**Aviation MEDEVAC.** Same as above.

**Aviation Reconnaissance.** Provides real time information to LEA. Average length of operation is two to three days.

**Controlled Delivery.** Support is provided by U.S. Transportation Command using military aircraft to transport law enforcement agents, vehicles and illegal drugs in support of ongoing counterdrug operations.

**Dive Operations.** Units have the capability to insert, extract and navigate in rivers or open water thus enabling observation of islands, coastlines or rivers. Average length is twenty-one days. This operations can be combined with helicopter operations to enhance insert/extract and observation capabilities.

**Ground Reconnaissance.** Average duration is twenty one days. Helicopters, vehicles, ground sensors and ground surveillance radar can be combined with ground reconnaissance to increase effectiveness.

**Ground Transportation.** Provided vehicles and drivers when needed.

**Ground Surveillance Radar.** Length of operation ranges from seven to thirty days. This operation is most effective when combined with other ground elements.

**Imagery FLIR (forward looking infrared radar) Listening Post/Observation Post.** Average length

of operation is twenty-one days. This operation combines night vision devices, thermal imagery devices and individual weapons for force protection.

Radar. Used in surveillance.

Sensors. Information collection activities with an average length of operation of twenty-one to ninety days.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle. Provides real time imagery to LEA and average length of this type of mission is twenty one days. They are a significant force multiplier when combined with ground forces.

#### **Intelligence Missions:**

General Support Intelligence. Provides dedicated on site intelligence support.

Support can range from sixty to one hundred seventy nine days.

Imagery Photo. This process provides photographs or video for identifying suspected activity, suspected landing strips and possible cultivation sites. Average duration of this operation is usually one day.

Intelligence Analysis. Provided as required.

Linguists/Translators. Provided as required.

#### **General Support Missions:**

Canine. This operation provides dog handler and a dog employed as a team. This operation can last up to one hundred and seventy nine days.

Communications. This support is used to enhance LEA use of the electromagnetic spectrum.

General Support Miscellaneous. Provided as required.

Maintenance. This support is usually for military loaned equipment.

Mobile Training Team. This operation is to instruct on specific subjects selected by LEA.

Technology. This support provides LEA with the source of expert advice, equipment technology demonstrations, and vendor screening as well as on site technology solutions for the enhancing LEAs counterdrug capabilities.

**Engineer Missions:**

Engineering and Construction. During these operations, engineers perform assessment, emplace or remove obstacles, construct or improve counterdrug trails/roads and fences and light construction as well as other functions to support deter drug activities. JTF-6 provides the personnel and equipment, LEA funds and procures the material.

Engineer Assessments. Same as above.

Engineer Base Operations Facility. Same as above.

Engineer Demo of Operations Facility. Same as above.

Engineer Training Facility. Same as above.

Engineer Boarder Fences. Same as above.

Engineer Lighting. Same as above.

Engineer Boarder Roads. Same as above.

**Rapid Support Missions:**

RSU. Consist of U.S. Army Special Forces Company. They conduct operations through the JTF-6 area of operation. Support normally ranges form one to fourteen days.

RSU Aviation's Operations. Same as above.

RSU Deployment. Same as above.

RSU Dive Operations. Same as above.

RSU Ground Reconnaissance. Same as above.

RSU Listening Post/Observation Post. Same as above.

RSU Mobile Training Team. Same as above.

RSU Sensors. Same as above.

## BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY

The literary resources that discuss counterdrugs and the illegal drug problem are numerous. However, the resources that particularly provide information on the military's role as a participant in counterdrug operations are limited. Specific information on military capabilities and procedures for conducting counterdrug operations were obtained from military manuals and other military resources. The internet provided a proved to be a great source for current and up to date information.

The book Smoke and Mirrors was written by an Argentine author who was heavily involved in his country's drug policies as the solicitor to the Argentine Supreme Court and had constant involvement with the drug problems in Bolivia. He moved to the United States and received a grant to go back to Bolivia to investigate the war on drugs in detail. His book details how the exporting of cocaine and cocaine products became a big business in Bolivia. It became the mean of survival for many of the people of the highlands and they were able to continue operations while eluding their government and the United State government.

This book Campaign Planning and the Drug War provides an understanding of all of the government agencies involved in the "War on Drugs." It explains what these agencies are and how they work together during counterdrug operations. Chapter one of this book explains how the problems with drugs in the United States grew over the years and how it is now effecting all of us with the spread of AIDS and the babies who are born to mothers who use drugs. This chapter also gives a 1989 depiction of where these illegal drugs were coming from and how they are getting into the United States.



The book Strategic Planning and the Drug Threat is an updated version of the previous book written by the same authors. This book, which is currently in draft, provides a more detailed, up-to-date analogy of the drug situation and the United States' strategy to fight the drug threat. This document provided a detailed overview of the military's relationship to the other agencies involved in the drug war.

The book Sealing the Border, The Effects of Increased Military Participation in the Drug Interdiction provides an analysis on how and why drug trafficking has been profitable in the United States. It also identifies some of the influences that affect the price of these drugs. It highlights the risk versus profit aspect of drug smuggling. It provides an insight into the role that the military plays in counterdrugs as it analyzes the success of increased military involvement.

The GAO reports provide an insight on the control that the United States government maintains on the funds which are made available to the counterdrug effort. DOD Operated Aerostat Ship Although Conferees Denied Funds report was requested by the Subcommittee on DOD Appropriations. It reviewed the efforts of DOD to combine Sea-Based Aerostat (SBA) and Small Aerostat Surveillance System (SASS) missions in the Caribbean and DOD's use of funds appropriated in fiscal 1992 for the operations and maintenance of the SBA ships for purposes not authorized by Congress. The SASS, belonging to the U.S. Army and the SBA belonging to the U.S. Coast Guard were conducting the same mission, detecting and monitoring of ships and aircraft suspected of drug smuggling. The five SBA were transferred from the Coast Guard to the Army for counterdrug missions in the Caribbean. The committee approved funding of the five SBA and only two SASS. DOD spent about \$4.5 million to operate a third SASS. The report found that DOD failed to properly record the expenditure and could not show which fiscal year 1992 account was used to fund the additional SASS.

The Oversight Needed to Prevent Acquisition of Unnecessary Equipment GAO report was requested by the Committee on Government Operations. It reviewed the procurement and modification of aircraft and equipment used for detection and monitoring. The report found that both the Air National Guard and the Coast Guard used funds to modify the UC-26 (NG) and the EC-130V (CG) without a valid counterdrug requirement for the modified aircraft. In 1986 the Coast Guard had identified a need for a aircraft with 360 degree air-search radar but the need was not reevaluated after Congress designated DOD the single lead agency for detecting and monitoring air and maritime drug traffic.

The Status Report on Counterdrug Technology Development GAO report was requested by the Committee on Armed Services of the United States. It reviewed the then current (1992) efforts of the Chief Scientist, Office of National Drug Control Policy, to develop and demonstrate counter drug technology applications. The emphasis of the report was on DOD efforts to develop cargo container inspection technology. The report showed that the blue print designed by the Chief Scientist allowed each federal agency and department to develop their own budgets. The Technology Center (his office) was to act as a clearing house. The report showed that DOD, in coordination with US Customs Service published a plan for developing prototype counterdrug technology for the use in contraband detection/cargo container inspection.

The Heavy Investment in Military Surveillance is not Paying Off GAO report was requested by the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, House Committee on Government Operations. It reviewed the justification for DOD's counterdrug flying hours and steaming days to determine if the \$976 million spent from fiscal year 1989 through fiscal year 1993 is giving the government a good run for its money. The results of the report determined that the government's investment in military OPTEMPO does not appear to be providing a reasonable return. The report also determined that the return is unlikely to increase because the circumstances that have regulated

DOD to a support role either cannot change or are unlikely to change.

Counterdrug Operations Support Planning Guide is a guide designed to provide information to Law Enforcement Agencies on support available from the Department of Defense through JTF Six. It provides information on the concept of military support and some of the equipment and support that is available to them. It outlines the military rules of engagement in counterdrug operations as it is limited under Title 10 of the US Code and the Posse Comitatus Act.

The pamphlet Myths of Militarization, The Role of the Military in the War on Drugs in the Americas gives a negative view on the use of the United States military in counterdrug operations. It highlights successful operations, as in Operations HAT Trick II and Blast Furnace, as only temporary successes. It provides no insight into any of the success that the military has had in these operations. The bottom line for this author is that the alternative to militarization for counterdrug operations to be strictly civilian functions and excluded any military involvement.

The literature used in developing this thesis provided a bases for the thesis conclusion. All of the documents proved to be useful in reaching an overall conclusion. Both military and non military resources can be found that provide a thorough overview of how the military and other Federal agencies can work together in solving the illegal drug problem. It was determined that authors with past military experience or knowledge tend to have a clearer vision of how military focuses might support the prosecution of the drug war.

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